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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
Vol. 52 NOVEMBER, 1953 No. I 
PALSGRAF REVISITED* 
William L. Prossert 
PERHAPS the most celebrated of all tort cases is Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Company.1 Certainly it is one of the most contro-
versial. Thirteen judges in all passed upon the case, and seven of them 
were for the plaintiff, at least in the sense that they considered that the 
issue was one to be left to the jury. Four of the remaining six, sitting 
on the Court of Appeals of New York, had the :final word, and they set 
aside the verdict, dismissed the complaint, and ordered judgment for 
the defendant.2 The Advisers of the Restatement of Torts debated the 
question long and vigorously and approved the case by a narrowly 
divided vote. Subsequent decisions, even when they cite Palsgraf, have 
remained in a state of disagreement and confusion, and the problem 
presented cannot be said by any means to be settled and disposed of. 
The legal writers3 have galloped off in all directions, in a tangle of duty, 
" This article is one of the Thomas M. Cooley lectures delivered by Dean Prosser at 
the University of Michigan Law School, February 2-6, 1953. The series, "Selected Topics 
on the Law of Torts," will eventually be published in book form by the University of 
Michigan Law School.-Ed. 
t Boalt Professor of Law and Dean of the Law School, University of California, 
Berkeley.-Ed. 
1248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). 
2 The alignment was as follows: For the plaintiff: Humphrey, in the trial court; Seeger, 
Hagarty and Carswell, in the appellate division; Andrews, Crane and O'Brien, in the court 
of appeals. For the defendant: Lazansky and Young, in the appellate division; Cardozo, 
Pound, Lehman and Kellogg, in the court of appeals. 
3 Almost everyone who writes on negligence has a word to say about Palsgraf. The 
following list is by no means exclusive: Green, "The Palsgraf Case,'' 30 CoL. L. REv. 789 
(1930), reprinted in GREEN, JUDGE AND JtmY, c. 8 (1930); Goodhart, "The Unforeseeable 
Consequences of a Negligent Act," 39 YALE L.J. 449 (1930); Steuer, "The Conception of 
Duty in Personal Injury Cases in New York,'' 18 CoRN. L.Q. 51 (1932); HARPER, LAw 
oF ToRTS §73 (1933); Buckland, "The Duty to Take Care,'' 51 L.Q. REv. 637 (1935); 
Tilley, ''The English Rule as to Liability for Unintended Consequences," 33 MxcH. L. 
REv. 829 (1935); Porter, "The Measure of Damages in Contract and Tort," 5 CM.rn. L.J. 
176 (1935); Campbell, "Duty, Fault and Legal Cause,'' 1938 Wxs. L. REv. 402; Cowan, 
''The Riddle of the Palsgraf Case," 23 MrNN. L. REv. 46 (1938); Gregory, "Proximate 
• Cause in Negligence-A Retreat from Rationalization,'' 6 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 36 (1938); 
Seavey, "Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts,'' 52 HARv. L. REv. 372 (1939), 48 
YALE L. J. 390 (1939), 39 CoL. L. REv. 20 (1939); ELDREDGE, MoDERN ToRT PROBLEMS 
15-17 (1941); Ehrenzweig, ''Loss-Shifting and Quasi-Negligence: A New Interpretation 
of the Palsgraf Case," 8 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 729 (1941); Goodhart, "Bourhill v. Young,'' 
8 CAf.rn. L.J. 265 (1944); Scarborough, "'The Unforeseeable Consequences of a Negligent 
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negligence, foresight, hindsight, dire_ct and intervening causes, the di-
vision and classification of interests and injuries, liability without fault 
or in excess of fault, social policy, the balancing of various claims to 
protection or immunity, and everything else that inevitably becomes 
involved in any discussion of "proximate cause." 
It may be worse than useless to add another article to the spate. The 
excuse must be the fascination which the case has for both teachers and 
students of torts, the never-ending new facets which it offers year after 
year in the classroom, and the fact that, if one may judge by what has 
appeared in print, the writer is the one man alive who is not absolutely 
and altogether sure of the answer. An expression of difficulties, un-
certainties and doubts, arriving at no very definite conclusion, may at 
least be something of a novelty. 
Helen Palsgraf4 "was standing on a platform of defendant's railroad5 
after buying a ticket to go to Rockaway Beach. A train stopped at the 
station, bound for another place. Two men ran forward to catch it. 
One of the men reached the platform of the car without mishap, though 
the train was already moving. The other man, carrying a package, 
jumped aboard the car, but seemed unsteady as if about to fall. A guard 
on the car, who had held the door open, reached forward to help him in, 
and another guard on the platform pushed him from behind. In this . 
act, the package was dislodged, and fell upon the rails. It was a package 
of small size, about fifteen inches long,6 and covered by a newspaper. 
In fact it contained £reworks, 7 but there was nothing in its appearance 
Act'-Reconsidered," 2 RaTGERS L. REv. 196 (1948); Morison, "A Re-examination of the 
Duty of Care," 11 MoD. L. REv. 9 (1948); Greenwell, "Re Polemis and Remoteness of 
Damage in Tort," 24 AusT. L.J. 392 (1951); Eldredge, "The Role of Foreseeable Conse-
quences in Negligence Law," 23 PA. B.A.Q. 158 (1952); PROSSER, ToRTS §31 (1941). 
4 The Record of the case is set out in ScoTT AND SIMPSON, CAsEs ON CIVIL PROCE-
DURE (1950) at pages 891-940. It will be referred to hereafter as REcoRD. The plaintiff 
was a Brooklyn janitress and housewife, 43 years of age. She was accompanied by her two 
daughters, aged 15 and 12. REcoRD, 901. 
5 This was at the East New York station. REcoRD, 902. 
6 Actually a round or oval bundle, fifteen to twenty inches in diameter. REcoRD, 909. 
7 This is a conclusion from the event. It appears to rest chiefly on the testimony of the 
plaintiff (REcoRD, 903) that she heard "firecrackers shooting," and of another witness (917) 
that there were several explosions. There was a "ball of fire," much noise, and a "mass of 
black smoke'' (903, 907, 909, 919, 921, 922). The smoke extended to where the plaintiff 
stood, so that she and her daughter were "choked" in it. This lasted for an appreciable 
interval, long enough for the plaintiff to say to her daughter, ''Elizabeth, turn your back." 
Then "the scale blew and hit me on the side" (903). 
One witness testified that the explosion was not much like fireworks; "there wasn't 
much fire to it; there was mostly more smoke and noise" (919). The men running for the 
train were Italians, and the one with the bundle hit a woman in the stomach in his hurry 
(916). Although the train was stopped, and a bystander proposed to an officer to identify 
him (909), he apparently did not come forward, and disappeared. Any incurable romantic 
who visualizes the Mafia and an infernal machine is perhaps not entirely ruled out. 
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to give notice of its contents. The fireworks when they fell exploded.8 
The shock of the explosion threw down some scales0 at the other end of 
the platform, many feet away.10 The scales struck the plaintiff, causing 
injuries for which she sues."11 The date was not July 4, but August 24, 
1924,12 and no one in the station except the man with the package and 
his companion had any reason whatever to suppose that he was carrying 
anything explosive. 
The defendant offered no evidence and moved to dismiss the case.13 
The trial court denied the motion, and instructed the jury that if the 
defendant's guards were careless and negligent in the way they handled 
the passenger boarding the train, the plaintiff was entitled to 
recover.14 The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of 
$6,000.15 Defendant's motion for a new trial was denied, and judg-
ment was entered on the verdict. 
On the first appeal16 the judges of the appellate division saw 
nothing in the case but "proximate cause." Three of them, in a short 
8 The package appears rather to have been set off by the wheels of the train. It fell 
between the platform and the train, and ''like stuck there, and as the train kept on moving 
why, it caused it to explode" (RllcoRD, 919). About a second elapsed between the fall and 
the explosion, during which "about half a car went by'' (911). 
9 No witness saw this. There was testimony that afterward the scale was found to be 
''blown right to pieces and knocked down, the glass was busted and blown-just simply laid 
down on the platform" (RllcoRD, 910). It was evidently an ordinary penny scale of the 
railroad platform type, with a mirror, standing as high as Mrs. Palsgraf's head (902). She 
testified that there was "Hying glass" (903), and her daughter said that she heard the scale 
''blow apart" (922). Notwithstanding all this, it is very probable, in line with the original 
theory of the plaintiff's complaint (896), that the scale was in fact knocked over by the 
stampede of frightened passengers (903). There was an appreciable interval after the "ball 
of fire'' before the "scale blew" (903). With the explosion occurring in the pit between 
the platform and the train, or under the wheels (919), it is difficult to see how the scale 
would not be completely protected from it. Although the platform was crowded (902), 
there is no indication in the RllcoRD that any other damage whatever was done by the 
explosion itself. 
10 The RllcoRD is annoyingly silent on this distance. The platform was twelve to fif-
teen feet wide (902, 917), but the plaintiff did not see where the package fell, and could 
not state how far away she was (907). No other witness was asked. Judge Andrews, at 
248 N.Y. 356, says that it was "apparently twenty-five or thirty feet." There was no plat 
in evidence, and Andrews could not have known, unless there was some statement of 
counsel. 
A motion for reargument was denied in 249 N.Y. 511, 164 N.E. 564 (1928). The 
court there said: "If we assume that the plaintiff was nearer the scene of the explosion 
than the prevailing opinion would suggest, she was not s~ near that injury from a falling 
package, not known to contain explosives, would be within the range of reasonable 
prevision." 
11 Quoted from the opinion of Cardozo, C.J., in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 
N.Y. 339 at 340-341, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). 
12 RllcoRD, 901. 
13 R:EcoRD, 928. 
14 R:EcoRD, 929-930. 
15 Rllconn, 931. 
16 Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 222 App. Div. 166, 225 N.Y.S. 412 (1927). 
4 MmmGAN LAw REvrnw [ Vol. 52 
opinion, said that the causal connection was similar to that in the Squib 
Case, 17 and that the fact the guards did not know that the bundle con-
tained an explosive was no defense. Two others, in even fewer words, 
said that the explosion was not a likely or natural result of the conduct 
of the guards, and that the negligence of the passenger carrying the 
explosive was an "independent intervening cause." The judgment for 
the plaintiff was affirmed. No one seemed to consider the case at all 
important. 
It might never have been important if there had not occurred, at 
this point, one of those accidents which shape the course of the law. 
The opinion of the appellate division fell into the hands of Professor 
Francis H. Bohlen of Pennsylvania, who was at that time the Reporter 
of the American Law Institute for the Restatement of the Laiv of Tarts. 
Bohlen was even then struggling with the problem of duty in neg-
ligence cases, and particularly with duty to the unforeseeable plaintiff. 
He was well aware of the confusion in the cases of "proximate cause," 
and he was disposed to accept the position, already advanced by 
Bingham18 and Green,19 that in such cases as this the question is 
essentially one of duty, and that unless the defendant's conduct involves 
some foreseeable risk to the plaintiff, the defendant is under no duty 
to him at all, whatever his duty may be toward anyone els~.· He had 
prepared, for submission to his advisers, a draft of a section20 which 
stated this view. Palsgraf provided a perfect illustration, and Bohlen 
added a statement of the facts to his explanatory notes. 
Among the advisers who met to consider this draft was Chief Judge 
Cardozo of the New York Court of Appeals, who found himself 
suddenly and unexpectedly confronted with a discussion, by an 
eminent and entirely impartial group, of a lower New York decision 
which might very possibly be appealed to his court. He concluded that 
there would be no impropriety in his presence at the meeting, although 
he took no part in the discussion, and did not vote. He sat therefore as 
audience, to a long and lively debate, ranging over nearly all of the 
11 Scott v. Shepherd, 3 Wils. 403, 95 Eng. Rep. 1124 (1773). 
18 Bingham, "Some Suggestions Concerning 'Legal Cause' at Common Law," 9 CoL. 
L. REv. 16, 136 at 154 (1909). 
19 Green, "Axe Negligence and 'Proximate Cause' Determinable by the Same Test?" 
1 TEx. L. REv. 243 at 423 (1923); GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAusE (1927). 
20 Finally adopted as §281 of the Restatement of Torts. The pertinent provisions are 
as follows: 
"The actor is liable for an invasion of an interest of another, if: 
(a) the interest invaded is protected against unintentional invasion, and 
(b) the conduct of the actor is negligent with respect to such interest or any other 
similar interest of the other which is protected against unintentional invasion. . . ." 
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questions which since have surrounded Palsgraf, and going far beyond 
the scope of the arguments of counsel in the case, who were still 
foundering in the morass of proximate cause. The decision, by a 
narrow margin which may have consisted of a single vote, upheld the 
Reporter and approved his section.21 
Cardozo was convinced by the majority. When the appeal came 
on his return to Albany, he adopted their view, with the concurrence 
of three other judges of the court of appeals, as the law of the case. 
There was no liability, he said, because there was no negligence toward 
the plaintiff. Negligence must be a matter of some relation between 
the parties, some duty, which could be founded only on the foresee-
ability of some harm to the plaintiff in fact injured. "Negligence in 
the air, so to speak, will not do." The defendant's conduct did not 
become a "vrong to Mrs. Palsgraf merely because it threatened injury 
to someone else. She must sue "in her own right for a wrong personal 
to her, and not as the vicarious beneficiary of a breach of duty to 
another." Assuming, without deciding, that negligence toward the 
plaintiff would entail liability for any and all consequences, however 
novel or extraordinary, there was no such negligence here. The con-
duct of the guards toward the passenger involved no foreseeable risk 
that the plaintiff might be injured; it was therefore no tort as to her, and 
as a matter of law she could not recover. Cardozo added: "There is 
room for argument that a distinction is to be drawn according to the 
diversity of interests invaded by the act, as where conduct negligent 
in that it threatens an insignificant invasion of an interest in property 
results in an unforeseeable invasion of an interest of another order, as 
e.g., one of bodily security. Perhaps other distinctions may be neces-
sary. We do not go into the questions now."22 
21 The writer is indebted for this account of the meeting to Dean Young B. Smith of 
the Columbia Law School, who was present as one of the advisers. 
22 248 N.Y. 339 at 347, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). "The conduct of the defendant's guard, 
if a wrong in its relation to the holder of the package, was not a wrong in its relation to 
the plaintiff, standing far away. Relatively to her it was not negligence at all. Nothing in 
the situation gave notice that the falling package had in it the potency of peril to persons 
thus removed. Negligence is not actionable unless it involves the invasion of a legally 
protected interest, the violation of a right. 'Proof of negligence in the air, so to speak, will 
not do.' (Pollock, Torts [11th ed.], p. 455 ••• ) •..• "If no hazard was apparent to the eye 
of ordinary vigilance, an act innocent and harmless, at least to outward seeming, with 
reference to her, did not take to itself the quality of a tort because it happened to be a 
wrong, though apparently not one involving the risk of bodily insecurity, with reference to 
some one else. 'In every instance, before negligence can be predicated of a given act, back 
of the act must be sought and found a duty to the individual complaining, the observance 
of which would have averted or avoided the injury.' ..• 
''The argument for the plaintiff is built upon the shifting meanings of such words as 
'wrong' and 'wrongful,' and shares their instability. What the plaintiff must show is 'a 
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Judge Andrews, dissenting, met the issue head on. Negligence, he 
said, does not depend upon a relation between the defendant and the 
plaintiff; it is a wrong toward anyone in fact injured by the negligent 
act. There is a duty toward the world at large not to be negligent 
toward any person; and when an injury to the plaintiff results from a 
breach of this duty, she may have a cause of action. There are limita-
tions upon this liability, but they are limitations of "proximate cause," 
and the remoteness of the damage. On this what the prudent inight 
foresee may have a bearing, but it is only "some bearing, for the 
problem of proximate cause is -not to be solved by any one consider-
ation." It is not a question of logic, but of practical politics; and the 
courts do the best they can to draw an uncertain and wavering line, 
which will be practical and in keeping with the general understanding 
of mankind. The injury here was direct and immediate; the distance 
was short; there was no remoteness in time, little in space. It cannot 
be said as a matter of law that the plaintiff's injuries were not the 
proximate result of the negligence.23 
wrong' to herself, i.e., a violation of her own, right, and not merely a wrong to some one 
else, nor conduct 'wrongful' because unsocial, but not 'a wrong' to any one. • • • 
"Negligence, like risk, is thus a term of relation. Negligence in the abstract, apart from 
things related, is surely not a tort, if indeed it is understandable at all .••• Negligence is 
not a tort unless it results in the commission of a wrong, and the commission of a wrong 
imports the violation of a right, in this case, we are told, the right to be protected against 
interference with one's bodily security. But bodily security is protected, not against all 
forms of interference or aggression, but only against some. One who seeks redress at law 
does not make out a cause of action by showing without more that there has been damage 
to his person. If the harm was not willful, he must show that the act as to him had 
possibilities of danger so many and apparent as to entitle him to be protected against the 
doing of it though the harm was unintended. . • ." 
" ... We may assume, without deciding, that negligence, not at large or in the 
abstract, but in relation to the plaintiff, would entail liability for any and all consequences, 
however novel or extraordinary .••• " Cardozo, C.J., id. at 341-347. 
23 " ••• The result we shall reach depends upon our theory as to the nature of negli-
gence. Is it a relative concept-the breach of some duty owing to a particular person or to 
particular persons? Or where there is an act which unreasonably threatens the safety of 
others, is the doer liable for all its proximate consequences, even where they result in injury 
to one who would generally be thought to be outside the radius of danger? • • • 
" ... In an empty world negligence would not exist. It does involve a relationship 
between man and his fellows. But not merely a relationship between man and those whom 
he might reasonably expect his act would injure. Rather, a relationship between him and 
those whom he does in fact injure. If his act has a tendency to harm some one, it harms 
him a mile away as surely as it does those on the scene. • • • 
"The proposition is this. Every one owes to the world at large the duty of refraining 
from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of others. Such an act occurs. 
Not only is he wronged to whom harm might reasonably be expected to result, but he also 
who is in fact injured, even if he be outside what would generally be thought the danger 
zone. There needs be duty due the one complaining but this is not a duty to a particular 
individual because as to him harm might be expected. Harm to some one being the natural 
result of the act, not only that one alone, but all those in fact injured may complain .••• 
Unreasonable risk being taken, its consequences are not confined to those who might 
probably be hurt ••• 
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So ended the Palsgraf case. Before leaving the opm1ons, the 
comment may be ventured that, with due respect to the superlative style 
in which both are written, neither of them wears well on long acquaint-
ance. Both of them beg the question shamelessly, stating dogmatic 
propositions without reason or explanation. If there is or is not a duty 
to the plaintiff not to injure her in this way, nothing else remains to 
be said. Both of them assume that there was no relation whatever 
between the defendant and the plaintiff on which a duty might be 
founded; both utterly ignore the fact, on which the appellate division 
laid stress,24 that Mrs. Palsgraf was a passenger. From the moment 
that she bought her ticket the defendant did in fact owe her a duty of 
the highest care, one of the most stringent known to the law. The 
question was not one of injury to some stranger across the street, but of 
whether the duty to a passenger extended to the consequences of 
negligence threatening another passenger-which may very well be a 
different thing altogether. 
There is, furthermore, the question left unanswered by Cardozo: 
what would have been the result if the explosion had injured the owner 
of the package, or had damaged his suitcase on a baggage truck? There 
is also the troublesome matter of the scale, It is difficult to escape the 
conclusion that anything on a railroad platform so easily knocked over, 
whether by a paltry explosion of fireworks which damaged nothing 
else, or by a jostling and panicky crowd, had no business being there; 
and if there was negligence in having the scale, it was certainly 
negligence toward the plaintiff herself, who was standing beside it.25 
" •.• But there is one limitation. The damages must be so connected with the negli-
gence that the latter may be said to be the proximate cause of the former. • • • What we 
do mean by the word 'proximate' is, that because of convenience, of public policy, of a 
rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain 
point. This is not logic. It is practical politics .••. And here not what the [defendant] 
had reason to believe would be the result of his conduct, but what the prudent would fore-
see, may have a bearing. May have some bearing, for the problem of proximate cause is 
not to be solved by any one consideration." Andrews, J., dissenting in Palsgraf v. Long 
Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 at 347-354, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). 
24 "It must be remembered that the plaintiff was a passenger of the defendant and 
entitled to have the defendant exercise the highest degree of care required of common 
carriers." Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 222 App. Div. 166 at 168, 225 N.Y.S. 412 
(1927). 
25 On this basis the question becomes one of negligence toward the foreseeable plain-
tiff, with the foreseeable result brought about by quite unforeseeable means. Here the 
decisions are all for the plaintiff. Johnson v. Kosmos Portland Cement Co., (6th Cir. 1933) 
64 F. (2d) 193; Carroll v. Central Counties Gas Co., 74 Cal. App. 303, 240 P. 53 (1925); 
Washington & G. R. Co. v. Hickey, 166 U.S. 521, 17 S.Ct. 661 (1897); McDowell v. 
Village of Preston, 104 Minn. 263, 116 N.W. 470 (1908); Munsey v. Webb, 231 U.S. 
150, 34 S.Ct. 44 (1913); Dalton v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 241 Mass. 400, 135 N.E. 318 
(1922); Moore v. Townsend, 76 Minn. 64, 78 N.W. 880 (1899); Derosier v. New 
England Tel. & Tel. Co., 81 N.H. 451, 130 A. 145 (1925); Salisbury v. Herchenroder, 
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There is no mention of this at all, undoubtedly because the idea never 
occurred to counsel; but it occurs every year to some one of my law 
school freshmen, who then concludes that he is brighter than the New 
York Court of Appeals. 
All this aside, the case must be taken as it stands. The aftermath 
was that Cardozo' s opinion immediately became grist to the mill of 
Professor Bohlen, who dwelt upon it in presenting the Tentative 
Draft:26 of the Restatement to the annual meeting of the American Law 
Institute. The meeting, without discussion or even mention of the 
problem, accepted the language of the draft and threw the weight of 
the Restatement behind the decision.27 It is not likely that any other 
case in all history ever elevated itself by its own bootstraps in so remark-
able a manner. 
The Restatement notwithstanding, it cannot fairly be said that 
subsequent history has determined the issue. It has become fashionable 
to cite Palsgraf in every kind of negligence case, and most of the long 
array of references to it in the Citator must be disregarded as insigni-
ficant and immaterial.28 Some courts have purported to follow the 
case, or to rely upon it, in situations which appear to be quite clearly 
distinguishable. Thus Ohio, Maryland, and Maine29 have applied it to 
106 Mass. 458, 8 Am. Rep. 354 (1871); Teasdale v. Beacon Oil Co., 266 Mass. 25, 164 
N.E. 612 (1929); Van Cleef v. Chicago, 240 ill. 318, 88 N.E. 815 (1909); Riley v. 
Standard Oil Co., 214 Wis. 15, 252 N.W. 183 (1934); Gibson v. Garcia, 96 Cal. App. 
(2d) 681, 216 P. (2d) 119 (1950). 
26ToRTS RESTATEMENT, Tentative Draft No. 4 (1929), §165. 
217 PROCEEDINGS OF AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (1929), p. 171 (section 165: "no 
remarks"). 
There is a persistent legend that this meeting debated the Palsgraf case long and 
violently, and that the Reporter was finally upheld by the margin of a single vote. I have 
talked with gentlemen who were present, and who believed that they had a distinct recol-
lection to this effect. It would have been most appropriate, since everything else connected 
with the case was decided by one vote. But if the Proceedings speak truth, which scarcely 
can be doubted, the still more remarkable fact is that the meeting of the American Law 
Institute did not consider the Palsgraf question to be worth any "remarks" at all. 
28 Apart from mere incidental mention, the following are typical of these more or less 
casual references to the case: Hatch v. Globe Laundry Co., 132 Me. 379, 171 A. 387 
(1934) (cited for the proposition that the precise form of injury need not necessarily be 
foreseen, where a rescuer was found to be a foreseeable plaintiff); Morrison v. Medagl.ia, 
287 Mass. 46, 191 N.E. 133 (1934) (cited on the point that the conduct to be anticipated 
from a third person has a bearing on the defendant's duty, where some injury to the plain-
tiff was found to be clearly foreseeable); Mosley v. Arden Farms Co., 26 Cal. (2d) 213, 
157 P. (2d) 372 (1945) (cited in concurring opinion of Traynor, J., on the point that 
"proximate cause" is properly a question of duty, where all of the court agreed that harm 
to the plaintiff was foreseeable); Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Vaughn, 292 Ky. 120, 
166 S.W. (2d) 43 (1942) (cited on the duty point in a case of attractive nuisance). 
29 Hetrick v. Marion-Reserve Power Co., 141 Ohio St. 347, 48 N.E. (2d) 103 (1943); 
Birckhead v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 174 Md. 32, 197 A. 615 (1938); Andreu 
v. Welhnan, 144 Me. 36, 63 A. (2d) 926 (1949). 
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cases where no injury to anyone was to be anticipated, and there was 
simply no negligence at all. New Hampshire, Wyoming, and Utah30 
have relied on Palsgraf in support of the familiar rule that a statute 
intended to protect only a particular class of persons, or to guard only 
against a particular risk or type of harm, creates no duty as to any other 
class or risk. The written law and the policy of strict construction 
which refuses to extend its effect beyond the legislative purpose seem 
definitely to set this apart from any court-made rule. Missouri31 has 
mentioned the case in holding that the duty of train men toward 
passengers and drivers at crossings does not extend to an employee at 
work beside the track; but here, as in the case of trespassers,32 and as 
the decision recognized, there is an element of assumption of risk or 
responsibility on the part of the plaintiff, which limits any duty to him. 
Pennsylvania33 has done the same in holding that a landlord's liability 
for breach of his covenant to repair does not extend to an employee of 
the tenant. Whether this be right or wrong-and the Restatement 
itself does not agree34-it is at most a refusal to extend a contract 
obligation, voluntarily assumed for a consideration, and traditionally 
limited to the responsibilities contemplated by the parties at the time.35 
Wisconsin, New Mexico, Georgia, New Hampshire, and Mary-
land36 all have followed Palsgraf in holding that a plaintiff who is 
30 Flynn v. Gordon, 86 N.H. 198, 165 A. 715 (1933); Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. 
Murray, 40 Wyo. 324, 277 P. 703 (1929); Coray v. Southern Pacific Co., 112 Utah 166, 
185 P. (2d) 963 (1947). Compare, on the other ground, Kelly v. Henry Muhs Co., 71 
N.J.L. 358, 59 A. 23 (1904); Everett v. Great Northern R. Co., 100 Minn. 309, 111 N.W. 
281 (1907); Flanagan v. Sanders, 138 Mich. 253, 101 N.W. 581 (1904); Akers v. Chi-
cago, St. P., M. & 0. R. Co., 58 Minn. 540, 60 N.W. 669 (1894); Ingalsbe v. St. Louis-
San Francisco R. Co., 295 Mo. 177, 243 S.W. 323 (1922). 
81 Karr v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 341 Mo. 536, 108 S.W. (2d) 44 (1937). Com-
pare, on assumption of risk, Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. Nixon, 271 U.S. 218, 46 S.Ct. 
495 (1926); Carfelo v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., (2d Cir. 1931) 54 F. (2d) 475. 
32Compare Garland v. Boston & Maine R. Co., 76 N.H. 556, 86 A. 141 (1913); 
Wickenburg v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. R. Co., 94 Minn. 276, 102 N.W. 713 
(1905); Peterson v. South & W. R. Co., 143 N.C. 260, 55 S.E. 618 (1906). 
33 Harris v. Lewistown Trust Co., 326 Pa. 145, 191 A. 34 (1937). Compare Cullings 
v. Goetz, 256 N.Y. 287, 176 N.E. 397 (1931); Chelefou v. Springfield Institute for 
Savings, 297 Mass. 236, 8 N.E. (2d) 769 (1937); Timmons v. Williams Wood Products 
Corp., 164 S.C. 361, 162 S.E. 329 (1932). 
34 ToRTS RESTATEMENT, §§357, 378. Accord: Barron v. Liedloff, 95 Minn. 474, 104 
N.W. 289 (1905); Flood v. Pabst Brewing Co., 158 Wis. 626, 149 N.W. 489 (1914); 
Merchants' Cotton Press & Storage Co. v. Miller, 135 Tenn. 187, 186 S.W. 87 (1916). 
35 See McCoRMICK, DAMAGES, c. 22 (1935). 
36 Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935); Curry v. Journal 
Pub. Co., 41 N.M. 318, 68 P. (2d) 168 (1937); Blanchard v. Reliable Transfer Co., 71 
Ga. App. 843, 32 S.E. (2d) 420 (1944); Cote v. Litawa, 96 N.H. 174, 71 A. (2d) 792 
(1950); Resavage v. Davies, (Md. 1952) 86 A. (2d) 879. Palsgraf is distinguished in 
Frazee v. Western Dairy Products Co., 182 Wash. 578, 47 P. (2d) 1037 (1935), on the 
ground that the plaintiff was in the danger zone. It is cited in the dissent in Rasmussen 
v. Benson, 135 Neb. 232, 280 N.W. 890 (1937). 
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himself in a position of safety cannot recover for mental shock and 
injury brought about by the sight of harm or peril to another person, or 
to property, within the danger zone. Again, whether this be right or 
wrong,37 the £eld is one which the courts have long been reluctant to 
enter even where the mental injury is readily foreseeable; and the 
frequent mention of the difficulties of proof, the facility of fraud, and 
the problem of finding a place to stop and draw the line, suggests that 
here it is the nature of the interest invaded, the type of damage, which 
is the real obstacle. In the Second Circuit, Learned Hand has accepted 
Palsgraf fully in a decision holding that a defendant who negligently 
sinks a barge is not liable to underwriters who have insured it.38 One 
may question whether it is really so unforeseeable that any barge may 
have insurance, but if it is, the plaintiff's interest is one of contract, and 
there is ample authority, long before Palsgraf, that a contract interest is 
not entitled to protection against mere negligence.39 
It is difficult to conclude that such cases represent any established 
principle. For each of them, there are others to be found which come 
to the same conclusion on similar facts, but on other and better 
grounds. They suggest rather that duty in negligence cases is a very 
involved and complex problem, in which many factors interplay, and 
that the opinion of Cardozo perhaps greatly over-simplified the whole 
matter. _ 
When we come to the cases which cannot be so distinguished, they 
are few and divided. Pennsylvania40 has accepted Palsgraf fully in a 
case where an automobile struck a pedestrian and hurled his body 
Compare, on other grounds, Mahoney v. Dankwart, 108 Iowa 321, 79 N.W. 134 
(1899); Nuckles v. Tennessee Electric Power Co., 155 Tenn. 611, 299 S.W. 775 (1927); 
Ellsworth v. Massacar, 215 Mich. 511, 184 N.W. 408 (1921); Cleveland, C.C. & St. L. 
R. Co. v. Stewart, 24 Ind. App. 374, 56 N.E. 917 (1900). 
87 Contra: Spearman v. McCrary, 4 Ala. App. 473, 58 S. 927 (1912); Gulf, C. & 
S.F.R. Co. v. Coopwood, (Tex. Civ. App. 1906) 96 S.W. 102; cf. Cohn v. Ansonia Realty 
Co., 162 App. Div. 791, 148 N.Y.S. 39 (1914). 
88 Sinram v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (2d Cir. 1932) 61 F. (2d) 767. 
89 Anthony v. Slaid, 11 Mete. (Mass.) 290 (1846); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. 
v. New York & N.H. R. Co., 25 Conn. 265, 65 Am. Dec. 571 (1856); Peoria Marine & 
Fire Ins. Co. v. Frost, 37 Ill. 333 (1865); Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 
303, 48 S.Ct. 134 (1927); Thompson v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 165 N.C. 377, 81 S.E. 
315 (1914); La Societe Anonyme de Remorquage aHelice v. Bennetts, [1911] 1 K.B. 243; 
. Brink v. Wabash R. Co., 160 Mo. 87, 60 S.W. 1058 (1900); Dale v. Grant, 34 N.J.L. 142 
(1870); Byrd v. English, 117 Ga. 191, 43 S.E. 419 (1903); Pure Oil Co. v. Boyle, (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1930) 26 S.W. (2d) 161; cf. Economy Auto Ins. Co. v. Brown, 334 Ill. App. 
579, 79 N.E. (2d) 854 (1948). The insurance interest is not protected even when the 
defendant intentionally murders the insured, or burns down the insured property. Mobile 
Life Ins. Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S. 754, 24 L.Ed. 580 (1877); Rockingham Mut. Fire Ins. Co. 
v. Bosher, 39 Me. 253, 63 Am. Dec. 618 (1855). 
40 Dahlstrom v. Shrum, 368 Pa. 423, 84 A. (2d) 289 (1951). 
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against the plaintiff, who was behind a bus and in a position of safety. 
This type of case is an old one on which Pennsylvania has stood alone 
against a number of other jurisdictions.41 Rhode Island42 has approved 
Palsgraf in a dictum where a negligently hung fire extinguisher, upset 
by a third person, gave forth a hissing noise and caused a stampede, in 
which the plaintiff was injured. On the other hand, Tennessee43 has 
rejected the rule flatly in a case where a rubber mat overlapping the top 
step of a stairway in a department store caused injury to a customer who 
was around a corner at the bottom; and Arkansas44 has rejected it, at 
least in dictum, where smoke from a £re on a railroad right of way 
aggravated the plaintiff's tuberculosis. These last two cases rebelled 
chiefly against the idea that the issue was to be taken from the jury. 
Before Palsgraf there were other cases which on their facts clearly 
presented the problem of the unforeseeable plaintiff. Where the court 
expressly considered the duty theory it was sometimes held that there 
was a duty to one to whom no harm could be foreseen45 and sometimes 
that there was none.46 More often the court went off on "proximate 
cause," and the greater number of the decisions found that the causal 
connection was sufficiently close or direct and allowed the plaintiff to 
recover.47 It would be easy to dismiss these last opinions on the ground 
41 Wood v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 177 Pa. 306, 35 A. 699 (1896), went off on proxi-
mate cause. Contra, also on proximate cause, are Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Chap-
man, 80 Ala. 615, 2 S. 738 (1886); Solomon v. Branfman, 175 N.Y.S. 835 (App. Tenn 
1919); Wolfe v. Checker Taxi Co., 299 Mass. 225, 12 N.E. (2d) 849 (1938); Robinson 
v. Standard Oil Co., 89 Ind. App. 167, 166 N.E. 160 (1929); Kommerstad v. Great 
Northern R. Co., 120 Minn. 376, 139 N.W. 713 (1913) and 128 Minn. 505, 151 N.W. 
177 (1915). Cf. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hammill, 56 N.J.L. 370, 29 A. 151 (1894). 
42 Kane v. Burrillville Racing Assn., 73 R.I. 264, 54 A. (2d) 401 (1947). Since the 
text was written, Arizona has relied on Palsgraf in another intervening cause case, in which 
a motorist's statutory negligence in failing to have his automobile standing still at the curb 
when a highway patrolman passed sounding his siren led to a collision with a convoyed 
automobile travelling at high speed into an intersection in the nighttime on the wrong side 
of the road. West v. Cruz, 75 Ariz. 13, 251 P. (2d) 311 (1952). 
43 Jackson v. B. Lowenstein & Bros., 175 Tenn. 535, 136 S.W. (2d) 495 (1940). 
44 Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Johnson, 198 Ark. 1134, 133 S.W. (2d) 33 (1939). See 
also Pfeifer v. Standard Gateway Theater, 262 Wis. 229, 55 N.W. (2d) 29 (1952), 
refusing to apply the Palsgraf principle where defendant was negligent in policing its 
theater and a patron was hit in the eye with a spitball. 
45 Stevens v. Dudley, 56 Vt. 158 (1883); Wilson v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 30 N.D. 
456, 153 N.W. 429 (1915); Hollidge v. Duncan, 199 Mass. 121, 85 N.E. 186 (1908); 
Mize v. Rocky Mountain Bell Tel. Co., 38 Mont. 521, 100 P. 971 (1909); and see Poffen-
barger, J., in Bond v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 82 W.Va. 557, 96 S.E. 932 (1918). 
46 Goodlander Mill Co. v. Standard Oil Co., (7th Cir. 1894) 63 F. 400; Boyd v. 
Duluth, 126 Minn. 33, 147 N.W. 710 (1914); Trinity & B. V. R. Co. v. Blackshear, 106 
Tex. 515, 172 S.W. 544 (1915). Cf. Pittsfield Cottonwear Mfg. Co. v. Pittsfield Shoe Co., 
71 N.H. 522, 53 A. 807 (1902). 
47 See cases cited supra note 41. Also Ramsey v. Carolina-Tennessee Power Co., 195 
N.C. 788, 143 S.E. 861 (1928); Walmsley v. Rural Tel. Assn., 102 Kan. 139, 169 P. 
197 (1917); Jackson v. Galveston, H. & S.A. R. Co., 90 Tex. 372, 38 S.W. 745 (1897); 
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that they never saw the point of duty, but there is in them so much 
explicit consideration of the bearing of foreseeability that they seem 
rather to have decided it, under another name. 48 
Such is the state of the law. It is one of troubled waters, in which 
any one may fish. 
Duty 
The first problem in Palsgraf with which one must come to grips is 
the significance of duty. It means, of course, an obligation, to which 
the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to some standard of 
conduct toward another. The concept as such is unknown to the 
continental law, which has got along comfortably enough on the basis 
that fault is absolute and not relative and a limitation only on the basis · 
of the nature or remoteness of the consequences.49 It was apparently 
equally unknown to the early English law, which proceeded upon 
much the same basis.50 The fault which is absolute remains in the 
criminal law, and in the £eld of intentional torts, where the doctrine 
of "transferred intent" makes anyone who attempts to inflict physical 
injury upon another liable to any stranger whom he may accidentally 
injure instead.51 It was only when negligence began to take form as a 
Wallin v. Eastern R. Co., 83 Minn. 149, 86 N.W. 76 (1901). Cf. Osborne v. Montgom-
ery, 203 Wis. 223, 234 N.W. 372 (1931); Christianson v. Chicago, St. P. M. & 0. R. Co., 
67 Minn. 94, 69 N.W. 640 (1896). 
This was true particularly in the cases of fires spreading to an unusual distance. Smith 
v. London & S.W. R. Co., L.R. 6 C.P. 14 (1870); Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Stanford, 
12 Kan. 354, 15 Am. St. Rep. 362 (1874); Hoyt v. Jeffers, 30 Mich. 181 (1874); Kuhn 
v. Jewett, 32 N.J. Eq. 647 (1880); Poeppers v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co., 67 Mo. 715, 29 
Am. Rep. 518 (1878); Fent v. Toledo, P. & W. R. Co., 59 ill. 349, 14 Am. Rep. 13 
(1871); E.T. & H. K. Ide v. Boston & Maine R. Co., 83 Vt. 66, 74 A. 401 (1909). Contra: 
Ryan v. New York Central R. Co., 35 N.Y. 210, 91 Am. Dec. 49 (1866); Hoag & Alger 
v. Lake Shore & M.S. R. Co., 85 Pa. 293, 27 Am. Rep. 653 (1877). 
48As illustrating the two approaches, compare Wood v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 177 Pa. 
306, 35 A. 699 (1896), which went on proximate cause, with Dahlstrom v. Shrum, 368 
Pa. 423, 84 A. (2d) 289 (1951), which went off on duty. Is there any difference between 
the two opinions, except one of terminology? 
49 So, at least, says Buckland, "The Duty to Take Care," 51 L.Q. REv. 637 (1935). 
He analyzes, however, only the Roman law. My colleague, Dr. Ehrenzweig, considers that 
the requirement of "Rechtswidrigkeit" in German and Austrian law, and the doctrinal 
elements of the French "faute" come out at much the same place. See LAwsoN, NEGLI-
GENCE IN THE 0rvu, I.Aw 30-31 (1950). 
50Winfield, "Duty in Tortious Negligence," 34 CoL. L. REv. 41 (1934); 2 HoLDs-
WORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 50-54 (1931); 3 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
I.Aw 375-382 (1931). 
51 Talmage v. Smith, 101 Mich. 370, 59 N.W. 656 (1894); Peterson v. Haffner, 59 
Ind. 130, 26 Am. Rep. 81 (1877); Davis v. Collins, 69 S.C. 460, 48 S.E. 469 (1904); 
Bannister v. Mitchell, 127 Va. 578, 104 S.E. 800 (1920); Carnes v. Thompson, (Mo. 
1932) 48 S.W. (2d) 903; Morrow v. Flores, (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) 225 S.W. (2d) 621; 
TORTS RESTATEMENT §§16, 20. 
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separate basis of tort liability that the courts developed the idea of duty, 
as a matter of some specific relation between the plaintiff and the 
defendant, without which there could be no liability.52 We owe it to 
three English cases,53 decided between 1837 and 1842. The period 
of development was that of the industrial revolution, and it may be that 
duty was a device by which the courts were seeking, more or less 
unconsciously, to limit the responsibilities of growing industry within 
some reasonable bounds. 
Every one agrees that a duty must arise out of some "relation" 
between the parties, but what that relation is no one ever has succeeded 
in defining. Lord Esher once attempted54 to reduce it to a formula in 
terms of foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff. He would have been 
quite at home in the Palsgraf case; but ten years later55 he was forced 
to repudiate his own words. The last forlorn attempt at some general 
statement is that of Lord Atkin, in Donoghue 11. Stevenson: 56 
"The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, 
you must not injure your neighbour; and the lawyer's question, 
Who is my neighbour? receives a restricted reply. You must take 
reasonable care to avoid acts and omissions which you can reason-
ably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, 
then, in law is my neighbour? The answer seems to be-persons 
who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought 
reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected 
when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are 
called in question." 
Apply this to the recovery of a husband, a thousand miles away, for 
loss of the services of his wife, injured in an automobile accident 
through the negligence of the defendant, and we are lost indeed. 
What makes it all very perplexing is that our ideas of relations 
change, and duties with them. A little more than a century ago Lord 
Abinger57 foresaw that "the most absurd and outrageous consequences, 
52Win£eld, "Duty in Tortious Negligence," 34 CoL. L. R:sv. 41 (1934). 
53 Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing. (N.C.) 468 (1837); Langridge v. Levy, 2 M. & W. 
519, 150 Eng. Rep. 863 (1837); Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. 
Rep. 402 (1842). 
54Jn Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503 at 509 (1883): "Whenever any person is by 
circumstances placed in such a position with regard to another that every one of ordinary 
sense who did think would at once recognize that if he did not use ordinary care and skill 
in his own conduct with regard to those circumstances he would cause danger of injury to 
the person or property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such 
danger." 
55 In Le Lievre v. Gould, [1893] 1 Q.B. 491. 
56 [1932] A.C. 562 at 580. 
57 In Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842). 
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to which I can see no limit, would ensue," if it should ever be held that 
one party to a contract was under any obligation to anyone but his 
immediate promisee. All the progeny of Mac Pherson, 58 with even the 
belated concurrence of Massachusetts,59 have now given the lie to those 
words in the case of the manufacturer who sells his goods; and the duty 
is steadily extending to other types of contractors. 60 The question now 
is whether the liability of the contract itself shall be extended from the 
manufacturer to the ultimate consumer in the form of a warranty 
running with the goods. 61 For more than two generations it has been 
repeated that there can be no duty toward an unborn child;62 now all of 
a sudden the cases on prenatal injury are going the other way.63 It 
used to be held that one who gets himself into danger owes no duty to a 
rescuer injured in saving him;64 now all at once the duty is there.65 
It was once well settled law that one who negligently made misrepre-
sentations could owe no possible duty to a third person into whose hands 
they might come;66 there is now respectable authority that in some 
situations such a duty can be found. 67 It was once the law that a land-
lord leasing a small shop for the admission of the public owed no duty 
58 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). 
59 Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E. (2d) 693 (1946). 
60 Kalinowsky v. Truck Equipment Co., 237 App. Div. 472, 261 N.Y.S. 657 (1933) 
(repairman); Hudson v. Moonier, (8th Cir. 1939) 102 F. (2d) 96 (same); Hale v. 
Depaoli, 33 Cal. (2d) 228, 201 P. (2d) 1 (1948) (building contractor); McDonnell v. 
Wasenmiller, (8th Cir. 1934) 74 F. (2d) 320 (same); Wright v. Holland Furnace Co., 
186 Minn. 265, 243 N.W. 387 (1932) (same); Colbert v. Holland Furnace Co., 333 ill. 
78, 164 N.E. 162 (1928) (same); ToRTS REsTATEMENT §404. 
61 Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 S. 305 (1927); Klein v. 
Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. (2d) 272, 93 P. (2d) 799 (1939); Dothan Chero-Cola 
Bottling Co. v. Weeks, 16 Ala. App. 639, 80 S. 734 (1918); Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. 
Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W. (2d) 828 (1942). 
62 For example, Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. St. 
Rep. 242 (1884); Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921). 
63 Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E. (2d) 334 (1949); 
Jasinsky v. Potts, 153 Ohio St. 529, 92 N.E. (2d) (1950); Verkennes v. Comiea, 229 
Minn. 365, 38 N.W. (2d) 838 (1949); Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, (Md. 1951) 79 A. (2d) 
550; Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E. (2d) 691 (1951). The last named case 
is of particular importance, since it overrules the leading decision, Drobner v. Peters, supra 
note 62. 
64 Saylor v. Parsons, 122 Iowa 679, 98 N.W. 500 (1904); Linz v. McDonald, (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1911) 133 S.W. 535. 
65 Butler v. Jersey Coast News Co., 109 N.J.L. 255, 160 A. 659 (1932); Camey v. 
Buyea, 271 App. Div. 338, 65 N.Y.S. (2d) 902 (1946); Brugh v. Bigelow, 310 Mich. 74, 
16 N.W. (2d) 668 (1944); Longacre v. Reddick, (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) 215 S.W. (2d) 
404. Cf. Dodson v. Maddox, 359 Mo. 742, 223 S.W. (2d) 434 (1949). 
66 See, for example, Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 25 L. Ed. 621 (1879?. 
67 Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922); Anderson v. Spnesters-
bach, 69 Wash. 393, 125 P. 166 (1912); Dickle v. Nashville Abstract Co., 89 Tenn. 431, 
14 S.W. 896 (1890); Economy Building & Loan Assn. v. West Jersey Title & Guarantee 
,Co., 64 N.J.L. 27, 44 A. 854 (1899); Western Loan & Savings Co. v. Silver Bow Abstract 
,Co., 31 Mont. 448, 78 P. 774 (1904); Mulroy v. Wright, 185 Minn. 84, 240 N.W. 116 
{1931); Figuers v. Fly, 137 Tenn. 358, 193 S.W. 117 (1917). 
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to those who entered;68 all of the recent cases agree that the duty is 
clear.69 
These are shifting sands, and no fit foundation. There is a duty 
if the court says there is a duty; the law, like the Constitution, is what 
we make it. Duty is only a word with which we state our conclusion 
that there is or is not to be liability; it necessarily begs the essential 
question. When we £nd a duty, breach and damage, everything has 
been said. The word serves a useful purpose in directing attention to 
the obligation to be imposed upon the defendant, rather than the causal 
sequence of events; beyond that it serves none. In the decision whether 
or not there is a duty, many factors interplay: the hand of history, our 
ideas of morals and justice, the convenience of administration of the 
rule, and our social ideas as to where the loss should fall.7° In the end 
the .court will decide whether there is a duty on the basis of the mores 
of the community, "always keeping in mind the fact that we endeavor 
to make a rule in each case that will be practical and in keeping with 
the general understanding of mankind."11 
Does the railroad, then, owe a duty to Mrs. Palsgraf not to injure 
her in this way? Why, yes, if the court 6.nds that it does. There is no 
other answer. Leaving out of account, as did the New York court, the 
fact that the woman was a passenger, there is still a relation to be found 
between the parties. It is the relation of close proximity in time, space, 
and direct causal sequence, between a negligent defendant and the 
person he injures. Many courts, in whatever language, have held this 
to be enough. If a count be made of all of the existing cases of "direct" 
physical injury to the unforeseeable plaintiff, the result is probably a 
slight majority in the plaintiff's favor. Almost as many courts have 
said no. The problem remains unanswered. 
It does not help to ask, what is the purpose of the rule which 
requires railroads to use proper care in aiding passengers to board trains; 
and is it to protect people on the platform from injuries brought about 
68 See, for example, Bender v. Weber, 250 Mo. 551, 157 S.W. 570 (1913); Clark v. 
Chase Hotel Co., 230 Mo. App. 739, 74 S.W. (2d) 498 (1934); TonTs REsTATEMENT 
§359. 
69 Webel v. Yale University, 125 Conn. 515, 7 A. (2d) 215 (1939); Senner v. Dane-
wolf, 139 Ore. 93, 6 P. (2d) 240 (1932); Wood v. Prudential Ins. Co., 212 Minn. 551, 
4 N.W. (2d) 617 (1942); Turner v. Kent, 134 Kan. 574, 7 P. (2d) 513 (1932); Gilligan 
v. Blakesley, 93 Colo. 370, 26 P. (2d) 808 (1933); Warner v. Lucey, 207 App. Div. 241, 
201 N.Y.S. 658 (1923), affd. 238 N.Y. 638, 144 N.E. 924 (1924). 
70 See Green, "The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases,'' 28 CoL. L. REv. 1014 
(1928), 29 CoL. L. REv. 255 (1929), reprinted in GREEN, JUDGE AND JtmY, c. 3. (1930). 
71 Andrews, J., dissenting in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 at 354-
355, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). 
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by unexpected explosions?72 The answer is, yes, if we make it so. We 
are not dealing here with a statute, written down in express words and 
limited by policy and tradition to the accomplishment of a legislative 
purpose. It is the court itself which makes the rule. There is, as a 
matter of fact, no tort rule whatever that a railroad may not be as 
negligent as it pleases. There is only a rule that if it is negligent it will 
be liable for damage. It will be liable for some damage to some people: 
but not for all damage to everyone. In deciding whether it shall be 
liable for this particular damage, it is of no aid to ask whether the rule 
we make is to extend to it. That is merely a dog chasing its own tail. 
Foreseeability and Risk 
We come next to the effect on this nebulous "duty" of the fact that 
the damage was, or was not, reasonably to be foreseen by a reasonable 
man in the position of the defendant. It needs no argument to show 
that duty does not always coincide with the foreseeable risk. The 
expert swimmer, with a boat at hand, who sees another drowning 
before his eyes, may sit on the dock, smoke his pipe, and watch him 
drovm.73 But it is still possible, as Cardozo contended, that the risk 
may be an outer boundary beyond which duty cannot extend, and that 
there is never any duty as to the unforeseeable plaintiff or the unfore-
seeable damage. 
Over this there is an ancient controversy which goes back to Baron 
Pollock74 in 1850. One position, of which Professor Seavey75 is the 
modem protagonist, is that the risk which determines the existence of 
negligence in the first instance limits the recovery for it, and that the 
same factors which characterize the conduct as wrongful define the 
scope of liability for its consequences. The other is that what the 
defendant might foresee is important in determining whether he was at 
fault at all but is not decisive as to the extent of the consequences for 
which, once negligent, he will be liable.76 The courts have fluctuated 
72 See Gregory, "Proximate Cause in Negligence-A Retreat from Rationalization,'' 6 
Umv. Cm. L. REv. 36 at 57-58 (1938). 
1s Osterlind v. Hill, 263 Mass. 73, 160 N.E. 301 (1928). Cf. Hurley v. Eddingfield, 
156 Ind. 416, 59 N.E. 1058 (1901); Allen v. Hixson, 111 Ga. 460, 36 S.E. 810 (1900); 
Riley v. Gulf, C. & S.F. R. Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) 160 S.W. 595; Toadvine v. 
Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. R. Co., (D.C. Ky. 1937) 20 F. Supp. 226. 
74 In Greenland v. Chaplin, 5 Ex. 243, 155 Eng. Rep. 104 (1850). 
75 Seavey, ''Principles of Torts,'' 56 HARV. L. REv. 72 (1942); Seavey, "Mr. Justice 
Cardozo and the Law of Torts," 52 HARV. L. REv. 372 (1939), 48 YALE L.J. 390 (1939), 
39 CoL. L. REv. 20 (1939). See also Eldredge, ''The Role of Foreseeable Consequences 
in Negligence Law,'' 23 PA. B.A.Q. 158 (1952). 
76 The classic statement of this position is by Mitchell, J., in Christianson v. Chicago, 
St. P. M. & 0. R. Co., 67 Minn. 94, 69 N.W. 640 (1896). 
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and vacillated between the two positions, and neither has been adopted 
with entire consistency or carried to all of its logical conclusions. 
In support of the limitation of liability to the foreseeable risk, it has 
been contended that it is more just, since the damages are consistent 
with the fault, and negligence may be only a slight deviation from the 
social standard, while its consequences may be out of all proportion to 
it. It is certainly more just from the point of view of the defendant, 
but it may be doubted that the plaintiff will appreciate the justice. The 
plaintiff has been hurt and some one must bear the loss. Essentially 
the choice is between an innocent plaintiff and a defendant who is 
admittedly at fault. If the loss is out of all proportion to the defendant's 
fault, it can be no less out of proportion to the plaintiff's innocence. If 
it is unjust to the defendant to make him bear the loss ·which he could 
not have foreseen, it is no less unjust to the plaintiff to make him bear 
a loss which he too could not have foreseen and which is not even due 
to his ovvn negligence but to that of another. In these cases there is no 
justice to be had. 
It has been said that the limitation is more rational, since it is more 
consistent with the "underlying theory" of negligence. This is true if 
we postulate an underlying theory of negligence in the abstract without 
its consequences; but there is no such ·thing. A cause of action for 
negligence must include damages as well as fault; and when we come to 
state a theory as to whether the plaintiff's damage is included as com-
pensable, we are once more begging the question. Once again the dog 
chases its tail. 
It has been said finally that the limitation is easier to administer, 
since it fixes the nearest thing to a definite boundary that is possible 
and gives us a degree of predictable certainty in the law. Predictable 
certainty and facility of administration are very desirable things if they 
are not purchased at too great a price. What degree of certainty does 
the limitation of foreseeable risk bring to these cases? 
It is relatively easy to say that the total risk, made up of the 
aggregate of all the possibilities of harm, large or small, probable or 
fantastic, is so great that the reasonable man of ordinary prudence 
· would not drive at an excessive speed. It is quite another matter to say 
that any one fragment of that risk, consisting of the particular con-
sequences that have in fact occurred, would have been sufficient in 
itself for the reasonable man to have it in mind and be deterred, or that 
it is so significant a part of the whole that liability should attach to it. 
Herein lies the distinction between the original fault and its results. 
It is clearly foreseeable that the speeding driver may hit another car 
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and kill a man. But what of the possibility that he may only bruise a 
shin, and cancer may develop from the bruise?77 Or that the car with 
which he collides may be thrown out of control and hit a third car, or 
even a fourth?78 Or that he will hit a man, whose body will be thrown 
several feet through the air and injure a person on the sidewalk?79 Or 
that he will narrowly miss a pregnant woman, who will be frightened 
into a miscarriage;80 or that he will injure her unborn child?81 Or that 
he will endanger a child in the street, and its rescuer will sustain a 
broken arm?82 Or that the person he injures may be left helpless in 
the street and be run over by another car?83 Or that he will hit a power 
line pole, mix up electric wires and start a fire, or kill a workman 
operating a machine two miles away?84 Or that he will hit a man 
carrying a shotgun, and the gun will be discharged, and a bystander be 
shot in the leg?85 There is a mathematical chance of all of these 
possibilities. All of them have occurred, and can occur again; and all 
of them have been held "proximate" by some court. But which of them 
are "foreseeable" in the sense of being a significant part of the risk 
recognizable in advance?86 
Such piecemeal foresight is a rope of sand, and offers neither 
certainty nor convenience, as the B.oundering in the cases seems to show. 
Here is Learned Hand, a great judge, blandly assuring us that it is 
beyond reasonable anticipation that a barge with which the defendant 
collides will sink, and will be carrying insurance.87 Here is Penn-
sylvania, twice88 asserting that no reasonable man could foresee that any 
77 Cf. Baltimore City Passenger R. Co. v. Kemp, 61 Md. 74 (1884); Allison v. Fred-
ericksburg, 112 Va. 243, 71 S.E. 525 (1911); Shaw v. Owl Drug Co., 4 Cal. App. (2d) 
191, 40 P. (2d) 588 (1935). 
78 Cf. Springer v. Pacific Fruit Exchange, 92 Cal. App. 732, 268 P. 951 (1928). 
79 Cf. Solomon v. Branfman, 175 N.Y.S. 835 (App. Term 1919); Wolfe v. Checker 
Taxi Co., 299 Mass. 225, 12 N.E. (2d) 849 (1938); Dahlstrom v. Shrum, 368 Pa. 423, 
84 A. (2d) 289 (1951). 
80 Purcell v. St. Paul City R. Co., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892). 
81 Cf. Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, (Md. 1951) 79 A. (2d) 550. 
82 Cf. Eckert v. Long Island R. Co., 43 N.Y. 502, 3 Am. Rep. 721 (1871). 
83 Cf. Morrison v. Medaglia, 287 Mass. 46, 191 N.E. 133 (1934); Adams v. Parish, 
189 Ky. 628, 225 S.W. 467 (1920); Thornton v. Eneroth, 177 Wash. 1, 30 P. (2d) 951 
(1934). 
84 Cf. Ramsey v. Carolina-Tennessee Power Co., 195 N.C. 788, 143 S.E. 861 (1928); 
Mize v. Rocky Mountain Bell Tel. Co., 38 Mont. 521, 100 P. 971 (1909). 
85 Cf. Walmsley v. Rural Tel. Assn., 102 Kan. 139, 169 P. 197 (1917). 
86 See Gregory, "Proximate Cause in Negligence-A Retreat from Rationalization," 6 
UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 35 at 60 (1938). The substance of this paragraph is repeated, with 
apology, from Prosser, "Proximate Cause in California,'' 38 CALIF. L. REv. 369 at 396 
(1950). 
87 Sinram v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (2d Cir. 1932) 61 F. (2d) 767. 
88Wood v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 177 Pa. 306, 35 A. 699 (1896); Dahlstrom v. Shrum, 
368 Pa. 423, 84 A. (2d) 289 (1951). With the Wood case in mind, I once asked the 
engineer of a fast train what would happen if he hit a man. He said, "Well, last week we 
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object struck by a speeding train or bus would B.y off at an angle and hit 
a person not directly in its path. Here is Wisconsin,89 affirming that 
when a child is run down in the street there is no recognizable risk that 
its mother, in the vicinity, may suffer mental shock. Here is New 
York, 90 solemnly declaring that the foreseeability of the spread of £re 
ends at the :6.rst adjoining house. I do not believe these things. I think 
they are rubbish. At the other extreme is another New York case,91 
:finding it all foreseeable when a collision forced a taxicab over a side-
walk and into a building, and loosened a stone, which fell upon a 
bystander and killed her, while the taxicab was being removed twenty 
minutes later by a wrecking car. There is also Texas,92 which had no 
difficulty at all in foreseeing that a mudhole left by a defendant in a 
highway would stall a car, that a rescuer attempting to tow it out would 
get his wooden leg stuck in the mud, and that a loop in the tow rope 
would lasso his good leg and break it. Illustrations might be multiplied, 
as every negligence lawyer knows, but surely these are enough. 
Foreseeability of risk, in short, carries only an illusion of certainty 
in defining the consequences for which the defendant will be liable. 
The attempt93 to broaden it by talking instead of consequences which 
are "normal" to the risk, or reasonably attachable to it, or "not highly 
extraordinary" in the light of it, seems in part at least to abandon the 
original reasoning and adds nothing in the way of definiteness. One of 
my students told me once that all this meant to him was that what 
happened should not be "too cockeyed and far-fetched." If that is true, 
why not look to the cockeyed consequences themselves rather than to 
the original fault? 
Transferred Negligence 
The question to which Cardozo and Andrews devoted most of their 
argument was whether negligence can be transferred-that is to say, 
hit a pig. It flew off at an angle of nearly 45 degrees for almost a hundred yards, and 
narrowly missed a fellow in a field." I refuse to believe that this particular hazard is 
unknown to the railroads. 
89 Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935). 
90Ryan v. New York Central R. Co., 35 N.Y. 210, 91 Am. Dec. 49 (1866). 
91 In re Guardian Casualty Co., 253 App. Div. 360, 2 N.Y.S. (2d) 232 (1938). 
92 Hines v. Morrow, (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) 236 S.W. 183. Morris, in "Proximate 
Cause in Minnesota," 34 Mnm. L. REv. 185 at 193 (1950), points out the extent to which 
a skillful advocate may influence the court's view as to what is foreseeable by his statement 
of the facts. He illustrates this by the Texas peg-leg case, where the court quoted the 
following statement of the facts from the plaintiff's brief: "The case stated in briefest form, 
is simply this: Appellee was on the highway, using it in a lawful manner, and slipped into 
this hole, created by appellant's negligence, and was injured in attempting to extricate 
himself." 
93 See Bohlen, ''Review of Harper, A Treatise on the Law of Torts," 47 HARV. L. 
REv. 556 (1934). 
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whether Mrs. Palsgraf, who was in no way foreseeably endangered, 
could base her cause of action on the railroad's negligence toward the 
man with the package. "Transferred intent" is familiar enough; the 
defendant who intentionally shoots at A is liable when he unforeseeably 
hits B instead. 94 The fault is regarded as absolute rather than relative, 
and the fact that a new person has entered the picture makes no 
difference. The doctrine comes down from the action of trespass, with 
its criminal origin, and it has been more or less strictly limited to the 
direct and immediate application of force to person or property.95 Its 
survival may be due to the close association of intentional torts such as 
battery with the criminal law. It may be due rather to a definite 
feeling that the intentional wrongdoer should make good the direct and 
immediate damage to a stranger. From the cases, it is impossible to say. 
Transferred negligence is not altogether unknown to the law. 
There are, for example, the "derivative" actions of a husband or parent 
for loss of the services of his injured wife or child;96 and it is still good 
law that an employer has a similar action for a negligent injury to his 
employee. 97 These are ancient actions, long antedating the whole idea 
of duty, and they are founded upon a special relation, amounting to 
legal status, between the defendant and the third person, and upon 
actual injury to the latter. Certainly there is no general rule that 
negligence is transferred; but are these the only instances in which 
recovery may be based upon negligence toward another? 
Let us take a case. The defendant, delivering a parcel, drives his 
truck up a private driveway to the back door of a home. On the way up 
he notices at the side of the driveway a large paper box or carton, open 
and visibly empty. Two minutes later, corning down the driveway, he 
negligently runs over the box. Negligently, because he knows it is 
there, it may be owned by some one, and it has some small value. In 
the meantime a two-yea:i;-old child, whose presence could not reasonably 
94 See cases cited supra note 51. 
95 Cf. Com v. Sheppard, 179 Minn. 490, 229 N.W. 869 (1930), where the defendant 
wrongfully shot at a dog and hit the plaintiff, with Renner v. Canfield, 36 Minn. 90, 30 
N.W. 435 (1886), where he merely frightened the plaintiff. 
96 It is generally held that the contributory negligence of the wife or child will prevent 
the plaintiff's recovery. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Honey, (8th Cir. 1894) 63 F. 39; 
Winner v. Oakland, 158 Pa. 405, 27 A. 1110 (1893); Cawley v. La Crosse City R. Co., 
106 Wis. 239, 82 N.W. 197 (1900); Callies v. Reliance Laundry Co., 188 Wis. 376, 206 
N.W. 198 (1925); Wueppesahl v. Connecticut Co., 87 Conn. 710, 89 A. 166 (1913); 
Bonefont v. Chapdelaine, 131 Me. 45, 158 A. 857 (1932). 
97 Ames v. Union R. Co., 117 Mass. 541, 19 Am. Rep. 426 (1875); Coal Land 
Development Co. v. Chidester, 86 W.Va. 561, 103 S.E. 923 (1920); Darmour Productions 
Corp. v. Herbert M. Baruch Corp., 135 Cal. App. 351, 27 P. (2d) 664 (1933); Bradford 
Corp. v. Webster, [1920] 2 K.B. 135. 
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be anticipated, has concealed himself in the box. Is the defendant 
liable for the death of the child? 
I cannot believe that any court ever ·will say no.98 If in the interval 
the owner of the box had filled it with Dresden china, no one would 
have any difficulty; nor can I see that it would make the slightest 
difference if the china were owned by a stranger. The connection 
benveen the box and its contents is too close, too obvious, too insepar-
able. The defendant has not run over an empty box; he has run over a 
box with something in it. Why should the fact that a new person has 
entered the case make all the difference? The situation is not unlike 
that of the unborn child in the body of its mother, where recent 
decisions have allowed recovery,99 and so far as I can discover recovery 
never has been denied on the ground that the plaintiff's presence was 
not to be foreseen. Or, if one wishes to be really fanciful, take the case 
of the Siamese twins, where the defendant sees only one head and can 
foresee only one person, but injures two. 
Obviously what we have here is a very close connection, almost 
identity, benveen the thing threatened and the person hit. Extend the 
connection slightly; put the child outside of the box, but concealed 
behind it-will the result be different? Not everyone will agree, but I 
would say no. The child is still almost part of the box;100 the defendant 
has run over no ordinary box, but a box which conceals a child. Extend 
the connection still further; the child is five feet away and behind a 
bush, invisible and unforeseeable, and the box Hies against him and 
injures him. Here, with the exception of those of Pennsylvania,101 the 
cases are agreed that the plaintiff can recover.102 The connection is one 
of close proximity in time and space, and direct and immediate appli-
cation of force. It is the connection of the old action of trespass and of 
the cases of "transferred intent." Nor is this process of extension 
merely a piece of professor's classroom sleight of hand. It is the process 
of the early cases on "proximate cause," in which the Squib Case103 
bulked very large. 
98 The facts stated are somewhat altered from those in Meeks Motor Freight v. Ham's 
Admr., 302 Ky. 71, 193 S.W. (2d) 745 (1945), where the driver had no specific reason 
to believe the box to be empty. The court ignored any question of negligence toward the 
owner of the box, apparently assuming it to be abandoned property, and made the instruc-
tion turn on some notice to the driver that there might be something inside it. 
99 See cases cited supra note 63. 
100 Cf. John C. Kupferle Foundry Co. v. St. Louis Merchants' Bridge Terminal R. Co., 
275 Mo. 451, 205 S.W. 57 (1918) (tank, with factory behind it). 
101 See cases cited supra notes 40 and 4 I. 
102 See cases cited supra note 41. 
103 Scott v. Shepherd, 3 Wils. 403, 95 Eng. Rep. 1124 (1773). 
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How far can the pr~cess be carried? Does it extend to Mrs. Pals-
graf? Once more the answer is, it does if we make it so. Put the 
child thirty feet away, and dynamite in the box, and you have the case 
in its essence. Once it is conceded that negligence can be transferred 
to closely connected plaintiffs, the question becomes only one of where 
to draw the line. We have reached the area of disagreement. There 
are many cases104 which, under the name of "proximate cause," have 
allowed recovery to persons and consequences even more remote. 
The quest of the "proximate" does not solve the problem. It adds 
nothing in the way of certainty or convenience; if anything, it only 
increases our difficulties, although perhaps not as much as the illusory 
certainty of the "area of risk'' would suggest. All that it does is to direct 
attention to the plaintiff as well as the defendant, to the role of the 
consequences as well as that of the fault. The one approach is at least 
as logical as the other; but whether we adopt one or the other we can 
only beg the essential question, whether the negligent defendant shall 
be liable for the damage he has done. 
Reduced to its lowest terms, the problem is one of the imposition of 
liability without fault, or in excess of fault, over and above the liability 
consistent with the fault. When a man with a weak heart is struck a 
light and glancing blow and drops dead, we have no trouble in saying 
that the liability must exceed the fault.105 The connection is too close, 
and too clear. Nor is there any difficulty where the result that was to be 
expected is brought about in a fantastic manner-as, for example, 
where a passenger is endangered in a railroad collision, and an engine 
is thrown out of control, runs around a circular track, and injures him 
in a second collision instead.106 It is when we get a different kind of 
injury that our troubles begin. No one doubts that the man with the 
package, to which alone harm was threatened, could have recovered for 
the destruction of his £reworks. That is the child in the box. But what 
if the explosion had put out his eye? 
104 See cases cited supra notes 41, 45, 47. 
105 Larson v. Boston Elevated R. Co., 212 Mass. 262, 98 N.E. 1048 (1912); Neff v. 
City of Cameron, 213 Mo. 350, lll S.W. 1139 (1908); Ross v. Great Northern R. Co., 
101 Minn. 122, lll N.W. 951 (1907); Champlin Refining Co. v. Thomas, (10th Cir. 
1937) 93 F. (2d) 133; McCahill v. New York Transp. Co., 201 N.Y. 221, 94 N.E. 616 
(19ll); Ominsky v. Charles Weinhagen & Co., ll3 Minn. 422, 129 N.W. 845 (1911). 
106 Bunting v. Hogsett, 139 Pa. 363, 21 A. 31 (1890). Cf. Hill v. Winsor, ll8 Mass. 
251 (1875); Selleck v. Lake Shore & M.S. R. Co., 93 Mich. 375, 53 N.W. 556 (1892); 
Hoeppner v. Southern Hotel Co., 142 Mo. 378, 44 S.W. 257 (1897); Gilson v. Delaware 
& Hudson Canal Co., 65 Vt. 213, 26 A. 70 (1892); Foss v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 151 
Minn. 506, 187 N.W. 609 (1922); Pulaski Gas Light Co. v. McClintock, 97 Ark. 576, 
134 S.W. 1189 (1911); Burklund v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 56 Idaho 703, 58 P. (2d) 
773 (1936). 
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Cardozo "assumes without deciding"107 that he would recover. On 
the basis of the very close and obvious connection, and the very direct 
causal sequence, I should say that he would; and I know of no case that 
has said, in a parallel situation, that he would not. This is the situation 
of In re Polemis,1°8 itself apparently approved by the Restatement,1°9 
where a plank dropped into the hold of a ship might have been expected 
to smash cargo but instead set off an explosion of petrol vapor which 
destroyed it by £re. But if the man with the package can recover for 
the loss of his eye, I cannot see that there is any sense, except as an 
arbitrary rule to get rid of the case, in a distinction according to the 
person who is injured. There is a fundamental and foolish incon-
sistency in saying that a defendant who threatens injury to A is liable 
for unforeseeable consequences to A, whether they be death from a 
weak heart or loss of an eye, but is not liable for the same unforeseeable 
consequences to B, who is standing beside A and virtually in his shoes. 
Put Mrs. Palsgraf on the train beside the passenger, with both of them 
injured by the explosion; is it not utter nonsense to say that recovery 
turns on which of them owns the package?110 
Nor can I :find any support whatever in the decisions for the 
suggestion of Cardozo,111 which was originally Bohlen's,112 that an 
arbitrary distinction is to be drawn according to the type of interest 
invaded, and that there is a difference between person and property, 
between the package and eye.113 Professor Goodhart has expressed 
alarm at "the terrifying prospect of a whole new series of cases in which 
it will be necessary to consider whether or not a person has the same 
interest in his foot and his eye, in his two adjoining houses, in his ship 
101paJsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 at 346, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). 
108 In re Polemis and Furness, Withy & Co., [1921] 3 K.B. 560. 
109 ToRTS REsTATEMENT §433, comment e. 
110 "The distinction is acutely presented when the actor has committed a wrong to one 
person, which in a train of unpredictable events involves another. In Palsgraf v. Long 
Island R.R. Co., •.. the court held that the defendant was not liable to the second person. 
If not, it is hard to see why it should make a difference that a single person is twice injured, 
once in a way that entails liability, and second, in such a way, as standing alone would be 
too remote. If he is so liable, a difference in ownership of the two pieces of property, 
successively injured, might exonerate a wrongdoer as to that injured last, though he would 
be liable, had both been owned by a single person-scarcely a relevant distinction." Learned 
Hand, C.J., in The Glendola, (2d Cir. 1931) 47 F. (2d) 206 at 207. 
111 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 at 346-347, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). 
112 Cf. TORTS RESTATEMENT §281, comment g. 
113 Cf. John C. Kupferle Foundry Co. v. St. Louis Merchants' Bridge Terminal R. Co., 
275 Mo. 451, 205 S.W. 57 (1918) (tank and factory); Knowlton v. New York & N.E. R. 
Co., 147 Mass. 606, 18 N.E. 580 (1888) (two adjoining lots). The contention of the 
Restatement was advanced by the dissenting opinion of Jaggard, J., in Lesch v. Great 
Northern R. Co., 97 Minn. 503, 106 N.W. 955 (1906), where the plaintiff recovered for 
mental anguish following the invasion of her property; but it was rejected by the majority 
of the court. 
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and the cargo which it carries."114 This has been dismissed with scorn 
as "the usual cry of the reactionary when faced with a new develop-
ment,"115 but if so, the new development is one as yet unknown to 
the courts. 
Where I come out, I think, is with the conclusion that the despised 
word "proximate" has more in the way of meaning and merit than it 
usually is given credit for; that all this is utterly incapable of reduction 
to any formula; and that the formula of the scope of the risk and the 
foreseeability of either the plaintiff or the consequences is as vague, as 
empty, as unworkable, and as unsatisfactory an explanation of what is 
actually in the cases as even the physical mechanics of Beale.116 
The Problem of the Place to Stop 
So far this has been a brief for Andrews; but more remains to be 
said. There is still the problem of an end to liability, of a place to stop. 
It is still unthinkable that any one shall be liable to the end of time for 
all of the results that follow in endless sequence from his single act. 
Causation cannot be the answer; in a very real sense the consequences 
of an act go forward to eternity, and back to the beginning of the world. 
Any attempt to impose responsibility on such a basis would result in 
infinite liability for all wrongful acts, which would "set society on edge 
and :611 the courts with endless litigation."117 To causation there is no 
end at all; and the preoccupation of the courts with the mechanism of 
causation is the source of much of our woe. Unless we can £ind some 
other way to limit liability short of what the act has clearly caused, we 
may be forced back to the scope of the foreseeable risk, unsatisfactory 
as it is, as the only available alternative to unlimited liability. It is of no 
aid to say, with Andrews,118 that the question is one of "practical 
politics," or with Edgerton119 that it is merely one of "justice." All of 
the law is a combination of both, and neither ever has been defined to 
the satisfaction of anyone. It is cold comfort either to the lawyer 
seeking to decide whether to settle his case, or to the judge seeking to 
decide how to decide it, to be told that there is "little to guide us other 
than common sense."120 
114 Goodhart, ''The Unforeseeable Consequences of a Negligent Act," 39 YALE L.J. 
449 at 467 (1930). 
115 Tilley, ''The English Rule as to Liability for Unintended Consequences," 33 
MxcH. L. REv. 829 at 850 (1935). 
116 Beale, "The Proximate Consequences of an Act," 33 HAllv. L. REv. 633 (1920). 
117Mitchell, J., in North v. Johnson, 58 Minn. 242, 59 N.W. 1012 (1894). 
11s Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 at 352, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). 
119 Edgerton, ''Legal Cause," 72 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 211 at 238 (1924). 
120 Andrews, J., in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 at 354, 162 N.E. 
99 (1928). 
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The only alternative to the "scope of the risk" to be found in the 
cases is "direct causation." This comes down to us from the old action 
of trespass and the Squib Case, and it represents the earliest attempt, 
still pursued by many courts, to find some close connection between the 
defendant's act and the damage done. "Direct causation" is easier of 
comprehension than of definition. "Direct" consequences are those 
which follow in unbroken sequence from the effect of the defendant's 
act upon conditions existing and forces already in operation at the time, 
without the intervention of any external forces which come into active 
operation later. There is an analogy, often mentioned, to knocking 
over the first of a row of blocks, after which all of the rest fall down · 
without the aid of any other force. Palsgraf is a typical case of direct 
causation: the guard knocked loose the package, its fall caused the 
explosion, the explosion knocked over· the scale, the scale hit the 
plaintiff. Nothing intervened. Many courts have said, at least, that 
"direct" consequences are always proximate, and recoverable, whatever 
their nature and whoever the plaintiff may be. Andrews does not go so 
far; but his chief reason for permitting Mrs. Palsgraf to recover is that 
the in jury to her was direct. 
This has been condemned, and rightly so, as laying an entirely 
undue emphasis on mere physics. It has been pointed out that any 
application of a theory of "direct causation" may require an arbitrary 
disregard of a number of intervening factors, and a selection of those to 
be regarded as significant. This is true, but it may not be too 
important. Actually the courts have had little difficulty with it. When 
a man is given poison it is easy enough to ignore all the complex 
chemical reactions brought about in his stomach by the food he puts into 
it for the next week and to concentrate on the simple fact that the poison 
killed him.121 
The difficulty is rather that direct causation draws no satisfactory 
line. Its consequences may go entirely too far. It is true that they are 
limited, not by foreseeability, but by the existing situation on which the 
defendant acts, the way the stage is set. They are not infinite but they 
may still be fantastic. Recognizing this, Andrews proposes a limitation 
based on the foreseeability of each step in the series, looking forward 
from the last.122 Given the explosion, is it foreseeable that it will knock 
121 McLaughlin, ''Proximate Cause," 39 HARv. L. REv. 149 (1925). 
122 " ••• What should be foreseen? No human foresight would suggest that a collision 
itself might injure one a block away. On the contrary, given an explosion, such a possi-
bility might be reasonably expected. I think the direct connection, the foresight of which 
the courts speak, assumes prevision of the explosion, for the immediate results of which, at 
least, the chauffeur is responsible." Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 at 
355, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). 
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over the scale? Given the falling scale, is it foreseeable that it will strike 
Mrs. Palsgraf? It needs only a moment's reflection to see where this 
goes. Mrs. Palsgraf falls on another package, which explodes and 
knocks over a more distant scale, which hits Mrs. O'Shaughnessy, who 
falls on another-but what we are getting is a Rube Goldberg cartoon. 
Nor, of course, is "direct causation" of any help once we pass the 
boundary of directness and consider the effect of other causes which 
intervene later in point of time. In determining whether they super-
sede the defendant's liability, the courts have been forced back to some-
thing like the foreseeable risk, although actually they have gone far 
beyond the limits of what any reasonable defendant would actually con-
template as the consequences of his act. The rescuer,123 the negligent 
doctor who aggravates the original injury,124 the pneumonia which 
carries off the victim while he lies in the hospital,125 the second injury 
which occurs while he is trying to walk on crutches,126 the frantic effort 
to escape which results in injury to the person threatened127 or to an-
other,128 the second collision with the car thrown across the road,129 
the second driver who runs over the man left helpless in the highway,130 
are at least not possibilities that any reasonable man could be expected 
to contemplate, think about, or have in mind while he is driving an 
automobile. They have to be justified by calling them "normal" con-
sequences, which appears to mean only that they are not unreasonably 
123 Eckert v. Long Island R. Co., 43 N.Y. 502, 3 Am. Rep. 721 (1871); Bond v. 
Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 82 W.Va. 557, 96 S.E. 932 (1918); Corbin v. Philadelphia, 195 Pa. 
461, 45 A. 1070 (1900); Wagner v. International R. Co., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 
(1921). 
124 Sauter v. New York Central R. Co., 66 N.Y. 50, 23 Am. Rep. 18 (1876); Selleck 
v. Janesville, 100 Wis. 157, 75 N.W. 975 (1898); Dewhirst v. Leopold, 194 Cal. 424, 
229 P. 30 (1924). . 
125 Beauchamp v. Saginaw Mining Co., 50 Mich. 163, 15 N.W. 65 (1883); Anderson 
v. Anderson, 188 Minn. 602, 248 N.W. 35 (1933); Wallace v. Ludwig, 292 Mass. 251, 
198 N.E. 159 (1935). 
126 Wagner v. Mittendorf, 232 N.Y. 481, 134 N.E. 539 (1922); Roseth v. Preston 
Mill Co., 49 Wash. 682, 96 P. 423 (1908); Hyvonen v. Hector Iron Co., 103 Minn. 331, 
ll5 N.W. 167 (1908); Squires v. Reynolds, 125 Conn. 366, 5 A. (2d) 877 (1939). 
127Tuttle v. Atlantic City R. Co., 66 N.J.L. 327, 49 A. 450 (1901); Lawrence v. 
Green, 70 Cal. 417, 11 P. 750 (1886); Twomley v. Central Park N. & E. R. Co., 69 N.Y. 
158, 25 Am. Rep. 162 (1877). 
12s Champagne v. A. Hamburger & Sons, 169 Cal. 683, 147 P. 954 (1915); Griffin 
v. Hustis, 234 Mass. 95, 125 N.E. 387 (1919); Gedeon v. East Ohio Gas Co., 128 Ohio 
St. 335, 190 N.E. 924 (1934). 
120 Holmberg v. Villaume, 158 Minn. 442, 197 N.W. 849 (1924); Reed v. Ogden 
& Moffett, 252 Mich. 362, 233 N.W. 345 (1930); Caylor v. B. C. Motor Transp. Co., 191 
Wash. 365, 71 P. (2d) 162 (1937). 
180 Morrison v. Medaglia, 287 Mass. 46, 191 N.E. 133 (1934); Thornton v. Eneroth, 
177 Wash. 1, 30 P. (2d) 951 (1934); Adams v. Parish, 189 Ky. 628, 225 S.W. 467 
(1920). 
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disconnected with the defendant's conduct. Neither the risk theory nor 
"directness" is of any real help in dealing with them. 
For reasons such as these, the opinion of Andrews is as barren as is 
Cardozo' s. It does, I think, come closer to a recognition of the diffi-
culties of the problem and the many factors that may bear on it, and 
it is less arbitrary in postulating an ironclad rule; but the formula it 
offers is no better as a universal solvent or a philosopher's stone. 
What is the true reason that so many of us feel that the case was 
correctly decided, and that Mrs. Palsgraf should not recover? It is not, 
I think, that no harm to her was to be foreseen in the first instance. It is 
that what did happen to her is too preposterous. Her connection with 
the defendant's guards and the package is too tenuous; in the old lan-
guage, she is too remote. The combination of events and circumstances 
necessary to injure her is too improbable, too fantastic; it is, as my fresh-
man so happily put it, "too cockeyed and far-fetched." He may have 
given us a clue. The Restatement,131 groping for the same idea, says 
that in retrospect it must not appear "highly extraordinary" that the 
defendant's conduct has brought about the result. The Restatement's 
comment:132 is unfortunate in the stress which it lays on retrospective 
knowledge of all the facts, for to omniscience any event whatever must 
appear not only probable but quite inevitable; but the basic idea is 
there, that liability must stop somewhere short of the freakish and the 
fantastic. 
If there is any middle ground between the restricted scope of the 
original risk on the one hand and the extreme lengths to which even 
direct causation may be carried on the other, it must lie in some reason-
ably close connection between the harm threatened and the harm done. 
If the connection clearly exists, as where the man with the weak heart 
drops dead after a slight blow,133 quite unforeseeable consequences are 
readily recoverable. Where it is more distant, consisting only of prox-
imity in time and space and direct causal sequence, as where the object 
struck by the vehicle Hies off at an angle and hits a bystander on the 
sidewalk, events of a more or less routine and ordinary kind may lead to 
recovery even though the court regards them as unforeseeable. When 
131 TonTs RESTATEMENT §433. Cf. Pfeifer v. Standard Gateway Theater, (Wis. 
1952) 55 N.W. (2d) 29 at 34: "Logic seems to be on the side of the dissenting opinion 
[in Palsgraf], yet the majority opinion can be justified from the standpoint that judicial 
policy warranted the result. The conscience of society might be shocked by imposing 
liability in such a case." 
132 TonTs REsTATEMENT §433, comment e. 
133 This seems to be the obvious explanation of Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231, 
177 N.E. 431 (1931). 
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we reach Mrs. Palsgraf and the nightmare accident which injured her, 
it may be time to stop. 
All this answers no questions, provides no formula, and does not 
help to state a rule. It is at most an approach, which may explain most 
but not all of the cases, and may appeal to those who are happy neither 
with Andrews nor with Cardozo. It suggests that the old words "proxi-
mate" and "remote," for which no one has had a kind word for half a 
century, may provide the best available answer after all, and that, as is 
sometimes the case where the courts continue to use a word for more 
than a century, they mean just what they say. 
The Riddle of the Palsgraf Case 
We come at last to the riddle13-t of the Palsgraf case: how can we 
state a rule? Preliminary to this is the question, can the matter be 
reduced to a rule at all; and preliminary to both is the question, what 
value would a rule have if we could state it? 
We are in a field of freak accidents, of crazy concatenations of cir-
cumstances, no one of which ever has been duplicated or ever will occur 
in exactly the same way again. It is not likely that there will be another 
Mrs. Palsgraf before judgment day. As a precedent her case is utterly 
worthless unless we can extract from it some generalization, some guide 
to a method of dealing with freak accidents, some prediction for the 
unpredictable. But freak accidents, in the aggregate, follow no pattern 
at all; and even where some superficial resemblance can be found, the 
details will vary so greatly and significantly from case to case that we 
may very well come, to different conclusions.135 A rule for the unpre-
dictable is itself a contradiction in terms. 
For what proposition of law does the Palsgraf case really stand? 
Professor Cowan, in a sadly neglected article, has stated it as follows: 
" . . . a railroad does not owe to an intending passenger the 
duty to refrain from permitting its guards to push upon a moving 
train another passenger carrying a package which, though innocent 
in appearance, contains fireworks, and which, if joggled from the 
boarding passenger's arm, will fall to the tracks, explode, shake the 
platform, knock down the scales, and thus injure the intending 
passenger."136 
134 See Cowan, "The Riddle of the Palsgraf Case,'' 23 MINN. L. REv. 46 (1938). 
185 Compare Kornmerstad v. Great Northern R. Co., 120 Minn. 376, 139 N.W. 713 
(1913), affd. 128 Minn. 505, 151 N.W. 177 (1915), where a horse struck by a train Hew 
195 feet through the air, bounced, and hit the plaintiff, working in a field, with Dahlstrom 
v. Shrum, 368 Pa. 423, 84 A. (2d) 289 (1951), where the plaintiff was a few feet away, 
in the street and behind a bus. Of course it does not simplify matters that the first case 
allowed recovery, while the second did not. 
186 Cowan, "The Riddle of the Palsgraf Case," 23 MINN. L. REv. 46 at 56 (1938). 
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As a guide to the decision of future cases, this is of course ridiculous. 
There will be no such cases. But when we try to state the proposition 
in more general terms we begin to include so many unpredictable fac-
tors which may affect our decision in any specific case that, as the rule 
approaches sweeping generalization, it loses all validity as a rule. No 
one would say, on the basis of the Palsgraf case, that a plaintiff can 
never recover for an injury brought about by an explosion. No one 
would say that there can be no recovery unless the event itself and the 
manner of its occurrence could reasonably have been foreseen. It may 
be quite as hazardous and unsound to say that no plaintiff can ever 
recover unless harm to that plaintiff was to be foreseen. A rule can have 
validity only as it applies to situations that recur without significant 
differences. Freak accidents do not recur, and the differences which can 
arise in them are virtually unlimited. 
Take the problem of the carrier which delays goods in transit, with 
the result that they are destroyed by an unforeseeable flood beyond all 
human experience. The federal rule, which controls as to interstate 
commerce, is that the carrier is not liable;137 many of the state courts 
hold that it is.138 As a practical matter recovery may tum on the desti-
nation of the goods, which makes no sense. But however the problem 
is to be decided it cannot be divorced from the fact that the defendant 
is a carrier, and its responsibility for the goods is that of an insurer 
against everything but "the act of God and the King's enemies." If the 
carrier deviates from the prescribed route it becomes liable when the 
goods are destroyed by an act of God in the course of the deviation;139 
if it fails to make delivery of the goods after arrival it becomes liable 
when the goods are so destroyed during the delay.1 ·10 The question is 
whether this responsibility extends to an act of God during delay in 
transit. How can any rule as to the "scope of the risk" evolved from 
two guards, a package of £.reworks and a scale aid in the slightest degree 
in the solution of this question? Is it proper, in Palsgraf itself, so utterly 
to ignore the fact that the plaintiff was a passenger, a person toward 
137Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Reeves, 10 Wall. (77 U.S.) 176 (1870); Northwestern 
Consolidated Milling Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 135 Minn. 363, 160 N.W. 1028 
(1917); Rodgers v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 75 Kan. 222, 88 P. 885 (1907); Seaboard Air 
Line R. Co. v. Mullin, 70 Fla. 450, 70 S. 467 (1915). 
13BBibb Broom Com Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R. Co., 94 Minn. 269, 102 N.W. 
709 (1905); Green-Wheeler Shoe Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R. Co., 130 Iowa 123, 106 
N.W. 498 (1906); Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Quarles, 145 Ala. 436, 40 S. 120 
(1906). 
139 Davis v. Garrett, 6 Bing. 716, 130 Eng. Rep. 1456 (1830); Seavey Co. v. Union 
Transit Co., 106 Wis. 394, 82 N.W. 285 (1900); Louisville & C. Packet Co. v. Rogers, 
20 Ind. App. 594, 49 N.E. 970 (1898). 
140 Richmond & D. R. Co. v. Benson, 86 Ga. 203, 12 S.E. 357 (1890); East Tennessee 
V. & G. R. Co. v. Kelly, 91 Tenn. 699, 20 S.W. 312 (1892). 
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whom the defendant had undertaken an unusual obligation of protec-
tion, requiring the highest care and perhaps extended liability? It may 
be that it makes no difference; but until the question is decided, is 
Palsgraf really definite authority even for Palsgraf? Might not another 
court, confronted by some miracle with a repetition of the facts, go off 
on the point that was ignored? 
Even where the problem appears to be essentially the sa~e, two 
courts may have widely differing views on the desirable result as a 
matter of social policy. New York holds that the liability of a railroad 
which negligently sets a :6re terminates after the first adjoining build-
ing.141 Kansas, carrying direct causation to an extreme, holds that it 
extends for at least four miles.142 New York is a state whose prosperity 
depends upon railroads, heavy industry and similar enterprises, and its 
courts always have been solicitous and fearful of an undue burden.143 
They have had in mind urban communities, in which most property of 
any value carries :6re insurance, and the possibility of a windfall for the 
insurance companies in the form of subrogation claims.144 Kansas has 
miles of uninsured wheat and its community attitude toward railroads 
is by no means the same. Who is to say that each decision is not 
defensible for the particular state? And what reason is there that the 
two jurisdictions must come to one and the same conclusion? 
As has been pointed out before, the defendants in these cases of 
"proximate cause" are in large measure railroads, public utilities, munic-
ipal corporations, industrial enterprises, automobile owners and others 
who are in a position, through rates, taxes or liability insurance, to pass 
the inevitable damages resulting from their activities on to the general 
public, or at least to distribute them over a relatively large group.145 
141 Ryan v. New York Central R. Co., 35 N.Y. 210, 91 Am. Dec. 49 (1866). 
142 Atchison, T. & S.F. R. Co. v. Stanford, 12 Kan. 354, 15 Am. Rep. 362 (1874). 
143 Cf. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928); 
Morse v. Buffalo Tank Corp., 280 N.Y. llO, 19 N.E. (2d) 981 (1939). 
144 "It is to be considered, also, that if the negligent party is liable to the owner of a 
remote building thus consumed, he would also be liable to the insurance companies who 
should pay losses to such remote owners. The principle of subrogation would entitle the 
companies to the benefit of every claim held by the party to whom a loss should be paid." 
Ryan v. New York Central R. Co., 35 N.Y. 210 at 217, 91 Am. Dec. 49 (1866). 
145 A count made in 1936 of 279 Minnesota cases on "proximate cause" revealed the 
following list of defendants: railroads and street railways, 129; other public utilities, 24; 
manufacturers, industrial concerns and public stores, 54; municipal corporations, 19; auto-
mobile owners, 20; other defendants (including physicians, individual employers, charitable 
corporations and others who might well have carried liability insurance), 33. 
A similar count made in 1950 of a total of 672 California cases resulted in the follow-
ing list: railways, street railways and other carriers, 137; steamship lines, 8; public utilities, 
68; manufacturers, industrial concerns and sellers of goods, 78; owners and occupiers of 
land, 75; employers, 31; municipal and other government corporations, 24; contractors, 39; 
automobile drivers, 137; physicians and surgeons, 22; notaries and other bonded officers, 13; 
other defendants (including several who might well have carried liability insurance), 48. 
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In the decision whether a particular loss is to be borne by such a defend-
ant, originally at fault if only in a lesser way, or by the innocent and 
helpless plaintiff, it cannot be supposed that this factor will be entirely 
disregarded by the courts, nor can it be expected that all defendants and 
all losses will be treated by all courts according to any one formula or 
rule. 
The bold and imaginative attempt of Professor Ehrenzweig146 to 
reduce all this to "enterprise liability," and to hold the defendant liable 
without fault, or at least in excess of his fault, for those damages which 
" · l" fth " · "b f h d " · l" are typ1ca o e enterprise, ut not or ot er amages not typ1ca , 
does not seem to me to provide the answer. It may be, and no doubt 
will be, the law of the year 2100, but it is not the present law, and the 
effort to make out a case for it as already prevalent is too labored, and 
culls far too many isolated and sporadic instances, ignoring far too much 
that looks the other way. It is easy enough to say that these defendants 
should pay for all "typical" losses regardless of their fault, and distribute 
them by insurance; it is quite another matter to say that society is ready 
to impose upon even some such defendants the possibly ruinous expense 
of that insurance. One has only to look at the experience in the legis-
latures with proposals for compulsory automobile insurance to see where 
the diffitulty lies and why any general progress in this direction must be 
slow. I must confess also that I find considerable difficulty in deter-
mining what is to be an "enterprise," and in applying that concept to 
the farmer in his Ford; and that when it comes to a fire which spreads 
three hundred yards from a railroad track, I have quite as much uncer-
tainty in deciding whether it is "typical" of a railroad enterprise as I do 
in dealing with it in any other way. 
The sole function of a rule of limitation in these cases is to tell the 
court that it must not let the case go to the jury. Yet we are in a realm 
where reasonable men do not agree. At least if judges and legal writers 
be reasonable men, they have not agreed. Palsgraf itself is the perfect 
illustration. When thirteen judges divide, and seven of them are with 
the final dissent, when the Advisers of the Institute divide, when the 
issue is repeatedly decided by a single vote and writers debate the case 
for twenty-five years without unity, there is something a bit cavalier and 
unreliable about Cardozo' s conclusion that no reasonable man could 
find for the plaintiff. Granted that the technical issue was whether the 
jury should have the case, it was not debated along those lines, but upon 
146 EHRENZWllIG, NEGLIGENCE Wl'I'HoUT FAULT (1951); Ehrenzweig, "Loss-Shifting 
and Quasi-Negligence: A New Interpretation of the Palsgraf Case," 8 Umv. Cm. L. REv. 
729 (1941). See Malone, ''This Brave New World-A Review of 'Negligence without 
Fault'," 25 So. CAL, L. REv. 14 (1951). 
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whether the plaintiff should recover. Granted further that somewhere 
a line must be drawn at which the case must be taken from the jury, 
Palgraf may well serve as an example and a warning to appellate courts 
to proceed with caution where facts vary so greatly and to avoid arbitrary 
rules which purport to be of universal application.147 We are not yet, 
in the middle of this century, so well settled and agreed on the basis 
and extent of tort liability that we can safely close and nail up the door. 
Conclusion 
The reader was warned at the outset that he would be offered no 
formula, no rules, and no conclusion. It has been, I think, always the 
formula, the generalization which has been at fault, in a £.elq where it 
seems impossible to generalize at all. "The mule don't kick according 
to no rule." Direct causation, the scope of the risk, the unforeseeable 
plaintiff, the last human wrongdoer, the distinction between cause and 
condition, limitations of time and. space, substantial factors, natural 
and probable consequences, mechanical systems of multiple rules, and 
all the rest of the rigmarole of "proximate cause," all have been tried 
and found wanting in situations that inevitably arise to which they do 
not and cannot provide a satisfactory solution. There is no substitute 
for dealing with the particular facts, and considering all the factors that 
bear on them, interlocked as they must be. In this respect Leon 
Green148 has been for a quarter of a century a voice crying in the wilder-
ness; and as one of the original scoffers at his doctrine, I make him 
belated obeisence. 
What we are left with is at most an approach to the problem, an 
attitude, a beginning-a vague, rough and general statement of what 
we are looking for. For this purpose, I doubt that all the manifold 
theories of the professors really have improved at all upon the old words 
"proximate" and "remote," with the idea they convey of some reasonable 
connection between the original negligence and its consequen.ces, be-
tween the harm threatened and the harm done. In other words, if there 
is a conclusion, it is that the courts may very possibly have been right 
all the time after all.1 49 
147 "[The Palsgraf Case], by virtue of the sharp difference of opinion of the judges, 
should be a warning to appellate courts not lightly to assume the primary duty of determin-
ing liability or nouliability, in actions of tort, but to leave that duty where the Constitution 
has placed it, with the jury, as triers of facts, and if they act capriciously and arbitrarily 
to supervise their action." Jackson v. B. Lowenstein & Bros., 175 Tenn. 535 at 538, 136 
S.W. (2d) 495 (1940). See also Pfeifer v. Standard Gateway Theater, 262 Wis. 229, 55 
N.W. (2d) 29 (1952). 
148 GREEN, RAnoNALE oF PROXIMATE CAasE (1927); GREEN, JUDGE AND Jany 
(1930). 
149 Contra: PnossER, TonTs 313 (1941). 
